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A Game of Old Maid: The Ninth Circuit
Establishes when the Owner-Operator is Determined
for CERCLA Liability in California v. Hearthside
Residential Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ripple effect of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill has extended
far beyond the coastal regions surrounding it. The massive oil
hemorrhage in the Gulf of Mexico has stirred up renewed discussion
among politicians and in the media over Superfund and the
importance of affixing responsibility to polluters.1 Superfund, or
more specifically, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),2 was enacted in 1980
as a response to “the serious environmental and health risks posed by
industrial pollution” and was intended “to ensure that the costs of
such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the
contamination.”3 Those that are liable for the contamination, as a
result of their relationship to the contamination, are identified as
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) by the statute. One such PRP
is the current “owner and operator” of the contaminated location.4
But unlike the other PRPs, who are assigned liability due to some
role in causing the contamination, this party’s only reason for being
“responsible” is ownership of the contaminated site.5 Like the last
player stuck holding the “Old Maid” in the classic card game,6 the

1. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, President to Push for Restoration of the Superfund Tax,
WASH. POST, June 21, 2010, at A5; Shari Shapiro, Deepwater Horizon—A Love Canal
Moment, CLEANTECHIES (June 2, 2010, 4:30 AM), http://blog.cleantechies.com/
2010/06/02/deepwater-horizon-love-canal-moment/ (suggesting that the Gulf spill is akin
to the disaster that prompted Superfund’s creation).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (2006).
3. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1874 (2009).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. Old Maid is a matching game played with a fifty-one card deck, in which players
take turns drawing cards from the prior player’s hand and then discarding any matching pairs.
“There is no winner in Old Maid; however, there is a clear loser—the person left holding the
unmatched card, or the old maid.” Daniel Farr, Old Maid, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLAY IN
TODAY’S SOCIETY 425, 425 (Rodney P. Carlisle ed., 2009).
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party holding title to the contaminated site is strictly liable for
cleanup expenses.7 Unfortunately, CERCLA is unclear regarding the
point in time at which the “card game” stops and a particular owneroperator is determined to be liable for cleanup. In other words,
where ownership to a particular site switches hands over a period of
time, CERCLA fails to specify which owner-operator is required to
front cleanup costs.
In California v. Hearthside Residential Corp., the Ninth Circuit
addressed whether “owner and operator” liability under CERCLA is
determined at the time of a cleanup action or at the time a resulting
suit is filed.8 As a “question of first impression” the court relied
primarily on what it viewed as “CERCLA’s purposes” to arrive at its
holding that the current owner and operator, for cleanup liability, is
set at the time cleanup occurs.9 This Note argues that the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis of this issue inappropriately diverges from the
Supreme Court’s prior interpretations of CERCLA because the court
failed to look at the plain meaning of the statute, did not strictly
apply liability, and should have found the current owner to be
determined when recovery for incurred cleanup costs are sought.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hearthside Residential Corporation (“Hearthside”) purchased a
tract of undeveloped wetlands in Huntington Beach, California in
1999.10 The tract, known as the Fieldstone Property, sat adjacent to
several residential plots (“Residential Site”) that were not owned or
occupied by Hearthside.11 At the time of purchase, Hearthside was
aware that the Fieldstone Property was contaminated by
polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCBs.12 By 2002, Hearthside had
entered into a consent order with the State of California’s
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
8. 613 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 2010).
9. Id. at 911, 914.
10. Id. at 911.
11. Id.
12. Id. PCBs are a member of the man-made organic chemical family known as
chlorinated hydrocarbons and were manufactured domestically, beginning in 1929, for use in
hundreds of industrial and commercial applications. PCBs were banned, however, in 1979
because of their toxicity. Studies have shown that PCBs cause cancer as well as “other adverse
health effects on the immune system, reproductive system, nervous system, and endocrine
system.” Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs): Basic Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
epawaste/hazard/tsd/pcbs/pubs/about.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
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Department of Toxic Substance Control (“the Department”) under
which Hearthside agreed to undertake remediation of the PCB
contamination of the Fieldstone Property.13 The Department also
determined that the adjoining Residential Site had been
contaminated by PCBs as a result of leakage from the Fieldstone
Property and considered Hearthside responsible for the process of
investigating and remediating the Residential Site.14 Hearthside
opposed this determination, asserting that it bore no responsibility
for the Residential Site and therefore limited its cleanup efforts to
just the Fieldstone Property.15
Subsequent to Hearthside’s refusal of responsibility for the PCB
contamination on the Residential Site, the Department contracted
cleanup efforts at the Residential Site, incurring ongoing cleanup
costs between July 2002 and October 2003.16 On December 1,
2005, the Department certified the completion of the Fieldstone
Property cleanup and Hearthside promptly sold the Fieldstone
Property to the California State Lands Commission.17 In October
2006, the Department filed a suit against Hearthside, seeking
reimbursement for the costs of the cleanup of the Residential Site.18
The Department’s complaint relied on two key points. First, the
Department alleged that the Fieldstone Property was the source of
the Residential Site contamination.19 Second, Hearthside had
ownership of the Fieldstone Property at the time of the Residential
Site’s cleanup.20 According to the Department’s analysis, Hearthside
was the “owner” of the contamination source at the time of the
cleanup effort and was therefore responsible for the costs of
remediation under CERCLA.21 Hearthside disputed the
Department’s assignment of liability, asserting that “owner” status
was instead established when the recovery suit was filed, rather than
at the time of cleanup.22 Hearthside was therefore not responsible for

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 911.
Id. at 911–12.
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2006).
Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 912.
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the cleanup costs of the Residential Site because it had sold the
Fieldstone Property prior to the Department filing suit.23
The district court, ruling only on the issue of whether
Hearthside was an “owner and operator” of the Fieldstone Property,
granted partial summary judgment in the Department’s favor.24 The
court concluded that determining “owner” status at the time the
cleanup claim occurs, rather than at the time of the lawsuit, aligns
with the stated purposes of CERCLA.25 The district court granted
the parties’ joint request to certify the question for immediate
appeal, which the Ninth Circuit agreed to hear.26
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
At issue in this case is the proper date from which to measure
ownership of contaminated property in order to determine who is a
PRP. Three areas of background inform an examination of
California v. Hearthside Residential Corp.: the origins and purpose
of CERCLA; how the Ninth Circuit has interpreted ambiguity in
CERCLA prior to Hearthside; and, finally, how the Supreme Court
has interpreted CERCLA ambiguity, specifically relating to the
identification of PRPs.
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act
CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund,27 causes “those
responsible for . . . contamination” to be held directly liable in order
to assure that the cleanup of designated hazardous sites actually
occurs.28 CERCLA, however, has required numerous clarifications
and interpretations by courts due to being “hastily assembled.”29 As
it imposes a strict liability standard,30 a significant amount of the
contested ambiguity revolves around the four PRPs identified in the
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The name “Superfund” comes from the statute’s creation of a trust fund called the
“Hazardous Substances Superfund.” 26 U.S.C. § 9507(a) (2006).
28. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1874 (2009).
29. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 885 nn.13–14 (9th Cir.
2001).
30. See infra Part III.C.
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statute:31 1) the owner and operator of a property, 2) any person
who owned a contaminated property at the time of contamination,
3) any person who arranged for transportation, disposal, or
treatment of hazardous substances by any other party, and 4) any
person who accepts hazardous substances for transportation to
disposal or treatment.32 Under CERCLA, an entity that qualifies as
one of these four types of PRPs “shall be liable for all costs of
removal or remediation incurred” at the contamination site.33
B. The Importance of Plain and Ordinary Meaning in Interpreting
CERCLA
In its most recent examination of CERCLA, Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Shell Oil Corp., the Supreme
Court was tasked with providing clarity to ambiguous terminology in
CERCLA.34 At issue in Burlington was whether Shell Oil qualified as
a party that “arranged for disposal” of contaminating material; if so,
it would be liable for cleanup as a PRP.35 Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority, stated that, in determining PRP liability, the Court first
looks to the language of the statute.36 But where the statutory
definitions of CERCLA fail to provide sufficient specificity, the
Court must “give the phrase its ordinary meaning.”37 In other
words, the Court will use “common parlance,” or the meaning of
the words as found in a dictionary.38 The Court then draws upon this
meaning as the “plain language of the statute.”39
This was not the first time the Court utilized the concept of plain
language or common usage to interpret CERCLA. In United States
v. Atlantic Research Corp., the Court relied on the “plain language”
of CERCLA when interpreting the phrase “any other person” to
mean that any private party—including another PRP—is authorized

31. See Burlington, 129 S. Ct. 1870; United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4) (2006).
33. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
34. 129 S. Ct. at 1878.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1879.
38. Id. The Court in Burlington actually derived its interpretation from MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary, citing to it directly.
39. Id.
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to commence cost-recovery actions.40 Similarly, in Cooper Industries,
Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., the Court used the concept of “natural
meaning” to interpret the use of “may” in CERCLA’s enabling
clause to authorize contributions to cleanup costs only in specific
circumstances, based upon the context of the language as read in
that sentence of the statute.41 Perhaps even more demonstrative of
the Court’s willingness to focus on plain meaning was its
interpretation of direct liability in United States v. Bestfoods.42 In
Bestfoods, the Court not only used the “plain language” of CERCLA
to indicate that a parent company is strictly liable for operating a
polluting facility but also again relied upon a dictionary definition—
this time for the word “operate”—to establish an ambiguous term’s
“ordinary meaning.”43
Admittedly, while these cases do not constitute an exhaustive
treatment of the Court’s use of plain or ordinary language to
interpret CERCLA, they nevertheless make it apparent that the
Court considers using the language of the statute—even when it is
simply stating what a common reading suggests—vital to resolving
ambiguity in CERCLA language.44
C. The Strict Liability Foundation in CERCLA
Strict liability “does not depend on actual negligence or intent to
harm,”45 and in fact the Court has suggested that “knowledge of the
facts [is] unnecessary.”46 Therefore, strict liability “maximizes
deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties” by establishing liability
based on bright-line conditions.47 For environmental contamination,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “CERCLA imposes
strict liability.”48 This strict liability standard relies upon “the seminal
40. 551 U.S. 128, 136 (2007).
41. 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004).
42. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
43. Id. at 65–67.
44. See also Meghrig v. KFC W. Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996) (using “plain
reading”); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994) (using “plain
terms”).
45. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009).
46. United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971).
47. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002) (citing Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14 (1991)).
48. E.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878
(2009).
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opinion” of Chief Judge Carl Rubin in United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp.,49 in which the Court found support for strict liability in the
history of CERCLA.50 While it is undisputed—both from historical
interpretation and recent Court discussion—that CERCLA imposes
strict liability, it is important to keep this background principle of
efficient enforcement in mind since it is a motivating factor for
imposing strict liability in the first place.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
In California v. Hearthside Residential Corp., the Ninth Circuit
set out to identify the time at which the current owner-operator is
determined under CERCLA.51 In reaching its decision on this issue,
which was a question of first impression, the court proceeded to use
three elements to frame its holding: 1) the language of CERCLA, 2)
the context of CERCLA liability, and 3) the purposes for CERCLA’s
creation. The court concluded by dismissing concern over the factual
determinations required by its decision.
A. CERCLA’s Language
After distinguishing Hearthside from other circuit court
discussions of ownership, the court identified the central issue as
simply determining the time at which a PRP becomes “the owner or
operator of a vessel or a facility.”52 Although not expressly stated in
CERCLA, the court interpreted this to mean the “current” owner or
operator of the contaminating location.53 The court noted, however,
that the definition of owner and operator is silent on the point in
time at which “current” ownership is determined.54 This absence of
clarity in the “plain text” of CERCLA required the court to look
beyond the plain language and use the statutory context and
purposes of CERCLA.55 The court reasoned that utilizing these
49. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
50. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1880–81.
51. 613 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 2010).
52. Id. at 910; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2006).
53. Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 912–13 (citing Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.,
270 Fed 863, 881 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)); accord, e.g., United States v. Capital Tax Corp.,
545 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008); ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 456
(6th Cir. 2007).
54. Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 913.
55. Id. at 914.
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elements of CERCLA would best illuminate how Congress intended
the determination of ownership to be measured when the language
of the statute is not plain.56
B. CERCLA’s Context
The court’s analysis of CERCLA’s context was largely based on a
review of those provisions related to imposition of liability under the
statute—specifically, the statute of limitations incorporated in
CERCLA.57 The court found it reasonable to assume that it was
Congress’s intent to have the statute of limitations run against the
owner of the property when cleanup occurred in order to protect
against stale claims.58 The court hypothesized that a well-timed
transfer of a cleaned property to an “innocent owner” could
undermine the aim of providing notice and predictability to a
defendant.59 The court took this view of the statute of limitations as
strong contextual evidence that Congress intended the “current
owner” to be the owner at the time of the cleanup effort.60
C. CERCLA’s Purposes
In the second prong of the court’s analysis, the court found that
an examination of the purposes of CERCLA produced the same
results as the court’s review of the statute’s context.61 The court
delineated the purposes of CERCLA into two components: 1) to
encourage responsible parties to remediate hazardous facilities
without delay and 2) to encourage early settlement between PRPs
and environmental regulators.62
1. CERCLA encourages PRPs to remediate without delay
This policy of incentivizing timely action, according to the court,
suggests that a landowner should be given no reason to delay
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 914–15. In the court’s hypothetical example, a recently cleaned property
could be sold to an innocent owner one day before the statute of limitations runs out and, as a
result, this “new” innocent owner would bear full liability for cleanup under CERCLA for any
timely recovery action that is later filed. Id.
60. Id. at 915.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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completion of cleanup—accomplished by attaching ownership
liability for recovery costs during the cleanup action.63 Conversely,
the court suggested that under Hearthside’s theory a property owner
could attempt to dodge liability by delaying cleanup completion
until he or she could arrange a transfer of the land to a new owner.64
This is particularly likely when a recovery suit will be filed once the
cleanup is complete and the actual total cost is calculated. Therefore,
the court reasoned that because an owner might employ any manner
of “contrived delay” as a means to secure a buyer—and thereby
transfer liability—before the suit is filed, ownership must be
determined based on when cleanup costs are incurred rather than the
filing of the suit.65
2. CERCLA encourages early settlement between PRPs and regulators
The court found that Hearthside’s argument—that current
ownership be determined at the time of the suit—is weakened by the
importance of settling in CERCLA on two counts.66 First, if
ownership is measured at the time the lawsuit is filed, then a lawsuit
must be filed for every recovery action, and any rule that would
create a lawsuit in every instance “is the opposite outcome that
CERCLA seeks to promote.”67 Secondly, an “agreed remedial action
plan” is central to CERCLA settlement, and the owner at the time of
cleanup is thereby included in the technical consulting process—
selecting from among the alternatives the scope of the cleanup.68 The
court reasoned that, because of CERCLA’s attempts to include the
owner during cleanup in the process, current ownership should be
set at the time cleanup occurs.69

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. CERCLA has been interpreted by the Ninth Circuit as emphasizing early
settlement on several occasions. See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863,
880 (9th Cir. 2001); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 948 (9th Cir.
2002).
67. Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 915.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 916.
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D. Factual Determination
The last portion of the court’s decision was concerned with
Hearthside’s assertion that the lawsuit-filing date would create “a
simple and clear date from which to measure” ownership.70 The
court agreed that measuring ownership from the time of cleanup
would, in some cases, necessitate factual determinations to determine
“current ownership.”71 Nevertheless, the court was not persuaded
that the “limited factfinding” required to determine ownership was
sufficiently burdensome so as to necessitate a different holding by
the court.72 Factual questions regarding cleanup dates are
commonplace in CERCLA actions, and the courts are “well
equipped” to resolve such issues.73 Therefore, in view of its weighty
consideration of CERCLA’s context and purposes, the court held
that current ownership for purposes of liability is to be measured
from the time of cleanup.74
V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly analyzed the issue of owneroperator determination under CERCLA in California v. Hearthside
Residential Corp. by failing to give proper deference to plain
meaning and strict liability in the examination of language, context,
purposes, and factual determinations under CERCLA.
A. CERCLA’s Language
The court’s holding that § 9607(a)(1) refers to the “current”
owner-operator of the contaminated site is the most logical
interpretation of the statute’s language. However, the court should
have reviewed the language of the statute more thoroughly in its
analysis. Instead of examining the “plain meaning” of the terms
“owner and operator” and “current” in the context of timing, the
court was quick to claim a lack of clarity and move to the intent and
purposes of CERCLA. Proper analysis of liability under CERCLA
must “begin with the language of the statute.”75 This is not to say
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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that the Ninth Circuit should have looked solely to the language,
but rather that the statutory language must be carefully examined for
the court’s analysis to be complete and proper.
The “owner” of a piece of land is commonly understood to be
the person holding title to it. Moreover, the definition of “own”—
“owner” being one who owns76—is “to have or hold as property.”77
Thus, both the plain meaning and the dictionary definition of owner
denote that to be an owner, a person must possess or hold title to
property. An individual who sells his property today was an owner
yesterday, but will not be tomorrow. Although the court suggests
that it is merely the timing behind the term that is ambiguous, it is
undisputable that the very meaning of the term “owner” is tied up
with timing. Therefore, it is not a question about when liability
attaches, but rather a question of when § 9607(a) is called upon to
establish liability. When § 9607(a) is invoked, the plain language of
CERCLA clearly considers the person holding title at that moment
to be the “owner and operator” for liability purposes.
B. CERCLA’s Context
The Ninth Circuit’s contextual analysis was limited to the statute
of limitations, examining both when the timing starts and the
protection it provides to PRPs. Congress’s activation of the statute of
limitations at the completion of removal and the initiation of
remediation is not “strong contextual evidence” as the court
suggests,78 but simply the most logical point in time. Before
remediation or removal, there has been no action taken, so it would
not be reasonable to start the clock for the statute of limitations.
Moreover, along the timeline of cleanup and recovery, the only other
point in time to activate the statute of limitations would be when
recovery is actually sought, most likely by filing a suit. Using cleanup
as the trigger is not indicative of Congress’s intent, but simply the
only practical option in that context.
Beyond the statute of limitations provision in CERCLA, the
calculation for the accrual of interest in the statute also provides
some contextual insight. CERCLA states in relevant part that

76. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1612 (1986). “Own” is the
verb implicated by the noun “owner.” Id.
77. Id.
78. Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 915.
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interest on cleanup costs accrues “from the later of” the date the
costs are incurred or the date a specific amount is demanded in
writing.79 This seems to indicate that the determination and
attribution of liability under CERCLA is invoked by formal
notification of intent to recover cleanup costs.
The court implied that CERCLA liability is frozen in time as
soon as cleanup commences. However, this is inconsistent within
CERCLA as initiation of remediation, completion of removal, and
written notification requesting recovery are all different points in the
timeline of CERCLA actions.
C. CERCLA’s Purposes
1. CERCLA encourages PRPs to remediate without delay
The court believed that an owner would delay cleanup efforts in
order to transfer the property before a suit is filed. However, in order
for an owner to effectively delay remediation or removal, that owner
would need to be in charge of those cleanup efforts—much like
Hearthside’s efforts to cleanup the Fieldstone Property.80 But there
will never be a suit filed for the cleanup costs resulting from the
owner’s efforts because that would result in the owner suing himself.
Instead, it is a third party, like the Department in Hearthside, who
sues to recover costs of the cleanup it coordinated either on or in
connection with the owner’s land.
Not only is it unlikely that an owner would be able to effectively
delay a cleanup performed by other parties, it is possible that if
liability is not determined until recovery is sought, owners will
remediate faster. For example, Hearthside acted timely to remediate
the contamination of PCBs on its own property and then quickly
sold the property within weeks of having the cleanup certified. There
would be no incentive for an owner to act quickly—to remediate,
certify cleanup, and pass the “old maid” card of ownership—when
liability will potentially follow him for six or more years. It would be
better to sit on the property and hope that the land increases in value
enough to offset the eventual cost of liability. However, by
determining ownership when recovery is sought, the owner during
any point of the cleanup is able to move on and assign liability for

79. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(i)–(ii) (2006).
80. See Hearthside, 613 F.3d at 911–12.
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the contaminated site. Future buyers would also benefit, as they
would receive cleaned lands, and the liability that follows “current
ownership” is a bargaining chip that would allow for deeply
discounted lands. Using the commencement of actions to recover
costs as the determining point in time—rather than the
commencement of cleanup—comports with CERCLA’s purpose of
encouraging remediation without delay as well.
2. CERCLA encourages early settlement between PRPs and
environmental regulators
The court presumed that if the time of filing is the key to
defining “current ownership,” such a standard would require
lawsuits for every recovery action, which would run counter to
CERCLA’s purpose of encouraging early and efficient settlement.
The court was correct that a scheme that uses such a standard for
determining ownership is inappropriate because it would be too
narrow. It would be more accurate and fitting to describe the
determining point in time to be when notice is given that recovery of
costs are being sought. This then includes the actual filing of a
lawsuit, agency orders requesting recovery, and even the sending of a
letter requesting repayment for costs incurred. When the total costs
incurred are known and repayment is sought, liability should attach.
With such a clear request presented, the “current owner” at that
time can easily settle or pursue litigation. This would then fulfill the
purposes behind the statute of limitations, accrual of interest, and
early settlement.
The court also stated that because the owner during cleanup can
“influence” the remediation program, he should be the one
responsible for the costs of that program.81 However, Hearthside
suggests a counterexample to the court’s reasoning—where the
owner denies responsibility, and so the government proceeds to
unilaterally contract the cleanup.82 Again the court seems to mix
cleanup actions undertaken by the owner with actions by the
government, which later seeks recovery of expenses. While the owner
during cleanup could be involved in the scope and measures taken to
remediate, the obvious possibility that recoverable cleanup can occur
without any input from the owner demonstrates that using this as a
81. Id. at 915–16.
82. Id. at 912.
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standard for supporting cleanup as a determining factor for
ownership is unsuitable.
D. Factual Determination
The court’s rejection of “a simple and clear date from which to
measure” seems out of place in the context of CERCLA’s strict
liability standard.83 This is especially true when the court does not
dispute that calculating ownership at cleanup can necessitate factual
determinations to determine “current ownership.”84 Requiring a
court to sort out facts also requires filing a suit for every claim and
actually discourages early settlement. By determining current
ownership at the time of recovery, CERCLA “maximizes deterrence
and eases enforcement difficulties”85 by reducing the need for even
limited fact-finding.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Hearthside, the Ninth Circuit failed to look at the plain
meaning of the language used in the statute, did not strictly apply
liability, and should have found the current owner to be determined
when recovery for incurred cleanup costs are sought, not when
cleanup happens. Like stopping a game of Old Maid when people
still have cards in their hand, determining liability during cleanup
prematurely stops the process before any of the parties involved are
actually ready to look at liability and settle up.
Dustin M. Glazier

83. Id. at 916.
84. Id.
85. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002).
 J.D. Candidate, April 2011, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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